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isbn 978-0-521-85932-5 hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. Bibliography 277 Index 282 Preface I offer in this book what is in some respects a new approach to Plato: one that attempts to take account of his strategies as a writer who writes, for the most part, in order to persuade his readers; an approach that attempts, in particular, to understand the way in which those strategies help to shape what he writes. In other words, my first concern is with understanding the nature of Platonic rhetoric. What he actually says, or has his main characterusually Socrates -say, is usually only a version of what he wants to say, designed to suit a particular audience on a particular occasion, as defined by the dramatis personae and the setting of the individual work; and he may well offer us different versions of the same thing, either in the same dialogue or, more usually, in others. It is one of the main claims of this book that trying to read off Plato's thinking from the surface of the dialogues is unlikely to be a reliable method for understanding him; especially when such a method is combined, as it often is, with a tendency to interpret different treatments of the same topic in chronological terms, that is, as evidence of 'developments' in his thinking. What will emerge, by the end of the book, is a Plato who will be, to most readers, and often for different reasons, unlike the Plato they have come to think they know. At the same time, however, I am conscious of returning, in some respects, to an earlier tradition, which I identify particularly with Paul Shorey, among the Anglophones, and among French scholars with figures like Auguste Diès, Joseph Moreau, and more recently Monique Dixsaut, the sensitivity of all of whom to the complexity and sophistication of Plato's writing resists domination by any particular school of interpretation -whether one that sees Plato as a purveyor of doctrines, or one that treats him as a thinker who above all wants us to think, for ourselves. (These are caricatures, one of an ancient tradition of interpretation, the second of a more modern one.) This may be wishful thinking, and I may be on my own, as in some parts of the book I surely am; nor would I claim the protection of the figures just named for the outcomes of this book. It is, however, certainly true viii Preface that the book finds itself opposed to the two tendencies I have just referred to. It is opposed, particularly, to the second type of interpretation, the non-doctrinalist one, which in one variety or another currently dominates Anglophone Platonic scholarship -usually in combination with a special 'developmental' thesis: that Plato started as a Socratic, but broke away in mid-career to become a Platonist. My own rival thesis is that Plato stayed a Socratic till the end. That is why, for the most part, he keeps Socrates on as his main speaker; 'Socrates', indeed, is his alter ego, his persona, his mask. And as it happens, this thesis also turns the normal non-'developmentalist', or 'unitarian' (also 'doctrinalist') type of interpretation on its head. The normal, contemporary 'unitarian' view starts from the 'mature' Plato and works backwards, so that Plato's Socraticism is submerged and obliterated. This view too I find mistaken and unhelpful, even if, over the centuries, it or some version of it has given the world what it understood as 'Plato'. So from at least two perspectives this will appear a radical book. Yet, as I have implied, I believe that this appearance has more to do with the directions that Platonic interpretation has taken in the last century than with the book's theses in themselves. As I read Shorey's The Unity of Plato's Thought, for example, from 1903, or Diès on Platonic transposition (1913), I have the sense that I am in large part only walking old and overgrown paths again. However the book is not written primarily in order to argue against any particular view of Plato. Rather, its purpose is to argue for a view which happens to be in opposition to others. This is reflected in the fact that I make relatively little reference to existing literature on Plato, rarely engage directly with others on particular points, and frequently fail to acknowledge that others have arrived before me at what may look like the same interpretations. My explanation, and excuse, apart from the fact that the book is already long enough, is that despite the extended and detailed discussions of particular stretches of text that occupy the larger part of the book, my overriding concern at every point is less with those discussions in themselves than with the larger argument they are designed to support. It is chiefly for that larger argument, and the light that it brings to Plato's texts, that I claim whatever degree of originality the book may have. My broad characterizations of current trends in Platonic scholarship are a product of ten years' service as compiler of 'Booknotes on Plato and Socrates' for Phronesis, with up to fifty books a year to read -mainly in English, but also in French, German, and Italian, occasionally in Spanish (or Catalan); crude my characterizations may be, but I dare say they are true enough to life.
My argument is, inevitably, still a work in progress. Since it will never be complete (and I have already had to cut out at least a third of what I
